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Grade Or Class Provision As A Basis For Disqualification
For Unemployment Compensation
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board1

The claimants, employees of Bethlehem Steel Company,
worked in the latter stages of a continuous production line,
their jobs consisting of finishing, shipping, and warehousing tin plate which was produced in earlier stages of the
assembly line. The workers in two of the earlier stages
were more skilled and received higher pay, although all of
the workers were members of the same union and under
the same union contract with the company. Some of the
workers in the earlier stages who had become dissatisfied
with the incentive pay provisions of the contract, began a
deliberate slowdown of production and as a result, less
work became available in the sections in which the claimants worked. The claimants, who were the most recently
hired employees, were laid off in accordance with the contract which provided that those with the least amount of
continuous service would be laid off first. None of the
claimants worked in the stages engaged in the slowdown,
nor were concerned with the incentive pay provisions as
they were paid at a fixed hourly rate. The findings indicated that the claimants had not participated in, had not
financed, or had not been directly interested in the dispute.
They sought unemployment compensation, and the Superior
Court of Baltimore City affirmed a decision of the Board
of Appeals granting compensation. The Court of Appeals,
in reversing the decision of the lower court, held that where
the claimants belonged to the same union, the same collective bargaining unit, and were under the same employment contract as those engaged in the deliberate slowdown,
and whose duties were part of a continuous integrated
production line, they were in the same grade or class as
those engaged in the slowdown and therefore were disqualified from receiving benefits under Sec. 6 (e) (2) of
the Maryland Unemployment Compensation Act.
The appropriate part of the statute, Sec. 6 (e) (2) ,2
provides that a claimant shall not be disqualified from re'219 Md. 146, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959).
8 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 95A, § 6, provides:
"Disqualification for benefit8. An individual shall be disqualified
for benefits (e) Stoppage of work because of labor disputes. - Flor any week
with respect to which the Executive Director finds that his
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or
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ceiving unemployment benefits, where his unemployment
is due to a labor dispute, unless he belongs to a grade or
class of workers engaged in the dispute.
Although the Court of Appeals has construed other parts
of Sec. 6 (e),1 the Court was afforded its first opportunity
to interpret Sec. 6 (e) (2) in relation to the issue of whether
the claimants were of the same grade or class of workers
as those participating in the slowdown.
The Court, in holding the claimants to be of the same4
grade or class, relied mainly on Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon,
an Illinois case involving a deliberate slowdown on the
assembly line in a shoe factory. There the employees belonged to the same union, had the same employment contract, and worked in the same continuous production line.
The claimants, who were laid off as a result of the slowdown, were paid at a different rate than that paid to those
instigating the slowdown, and had no interest in the outcome of the particular wage rate dispute. Nevertheless,
they were denied compensation on the basis of the Illinois
grade or class provision,5 which was substantially the same
as that presently in force in Maryland. The Maryland
Court, after weighing the factors in the instant case, comother premises at which he is or was last employed, provided
that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Executive Director that (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage
of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of
which, immediately before the commencement of the
stoppage, there were members employed, at the premises
at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of
work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate
departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be
deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or
other premises."
In Mitchell, Inc. v. Md. Emp. Sec. Bd., 209 Md. 237, 121 A. 2d 198 (1956),
the Court interpreting § 5(e) (1) of the 1951 Code, the equivalent of §
6(e) (1) of the 1957 Code, supra, n. 2, upheld claimants' disqualification
for benefits for refusal to cross picket lines, this constituting a participation in a labor dispute. See also Brown v. Md. Unemp. Comp. Board, 189
Md. 233, 55 A. 2d 696 (1947). In Tucker v. American S. & Ref. Co., 189
Md. 250, 55 A. 2d 692 (1947), the Court in construing Sec. 5(d) of the
1943 Code Supplement, the equivalent of Sec. 6(e) of the 1957 Code, supra,
n. 2, determined that a Utah copper smelter plant which supplied copper to
a Baltimbre refinery owned by the same company did not constitute one
establishment so as to disqualify claimants for benefits.
'405 I1. 384, 91 N.E. 2d 381 (1950).
5 ILL. REv. :STAT. (1947), Ch.48,
223.
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pared them with those in the Brown case." Then, faced
with the language of the provision, undefined by the legislature, as opposed to the potential harshness on the individual claimant, the Court reached its result in stressing
the factor of the continuous production line.
In view of the broad purpose of unemployment compensation to protect involuntary unemployment, it is hard
to rationalize the diversity of decisions which deal with
the grade or class provisions which appear in the Unemployment Acts of all but two states.' Some courts base
their determinations on membership in a union,' on the
similarity of the work performed, 9 on the entire plant or
establishment,"0 or on the same bargaining unit;" while
many courts, basing each case solely on its own merits,
consider a variety of factors, such as single or separate
labor agreements, skills, and pay rates, in conjunction with
those enumerated above. 12 The Court in the instant case
indicates however, that the cases involving a continuous
production line, where the later stages are dependent on
the earlier, seem to hold uniformly that all the employees
are in the same grade or class.18
The reasoning behind the grade or class provisions is
three-fold: First, and foremost, use of the provision prevents a situation where a few key workers in key positions
could by striking curtail production and cause a work stoppage, and fellow workers laid off as a result could conceivably augment the workers' fighting fund with their
unemployment benefits. Second, use of the provision prevents the unemployment compensation system from being
used as an inducement to those who might defect from a
Supra, n. 4.

Only Vermont, 21 V.S.A. (1959), § 1844, and Louisiana, 23 L.S.A. - R.S.
1601 (1950), hlave no comparable grade or 1a88 provision.
ICopen v. Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S.E. 2d 382 (1947); In Queener v.
Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W. 2d 1, 4 (1942), the court said: "We
think that 'grade or class', as used, in the statute, means a group more or
less organized. Not necessarily a local CIO or AFL branch, nor a company
union, but at least a cohesive group acting in concert. . ."
9 In re Deep River Timber Co.'s Employees, 8 Wash. 2d 179, 111 P. 2d
575 (1941).

'oWestinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 165 Pa.
Super. 385, 68 A. 2d 393 (1949).
n Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E. 2d 865 (1942).
1Byerly
v. Unemployment Compensation 'Board of Rev., 171 Pa. Super.
303, 90 A. 2d 322 (1952); Unemployment Compensation Commission v.
Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570, 50 S.E. 2d 497 (1948) ; Kieckhefer Container Co.
v. Unemployment C. Com'n., 125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A. 2d 646 (1940).
"Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, supra, n. 4; Adams v. Review Board, Etc.,
121 Ind. App. 273, 98 N.E. 2d 681 (1951); Unemployment Compensation
Commission v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 .S.E. 2d 385 (1947) ; Local No. 658 v.
Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E. 2d 625 (1949).
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union which calls a strike by a promise of benefits to those
who take no part in the dispute.1 4 Third, use of the provision facilitates the administration
of the system by clas15
sifying claims on a broad basis.
The Court points out in the instant case:
".. . we think it is clear that the present statutory
provision was deliberately aimed at discouraging 'key'
workers in 'key' positions along a continuous production line from effectively tieing up (sic) the operations
of a whole plant."'"
The law writers have been critical of the grade or class
provision and have called it the "vicarious guilt provision", the "dragnet provision",' "guilt by association", 19
and "vicarious disqualification."' 0 Generally, they have
urged its abrogation for the reason that it actually thwarts
the basic purpose of the law, that of giving benefits to those
involuntarily unemployed. Thousands of workers throughout the country have been disqualified from receiving benefits without having the slightest connection with a dispute.
Perhaps the broadest criticism of the provision is that
it doesn't effectively distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. The instant case exemplifies
this. As was said in Saunders v. Unemp. Comp. Board,2 '
"the purpose of the statute was to alleviate the consequences of involuntary unemployment." The grade or class
provision cuts sharply into this purpose.
It would seem that the direct interest provision, which
provides that a claimant shall be disqualified unless he is
not participating in or financing or directly interested in
the dispute, in itself is an adequate web for disqualification and would eliminate to a great extent the reason for
a grade or class provision. The more narrowly the courts
construe grade or class, the more it tends to equate the
worker under this provision with the worker who is directly
interested. Such a construction, in effect, virtually elimi"1Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J.
167, 169 (1945).
15See Note 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 763 (1949) ; see also opinion of Queener
v. Magnet Mills, supra, n. 8.
10219 Md. 146, 154, 148 A. 2d, 403 (1959).
17Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294, 332 (1950).
"1Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification - A Primer and Some
Problems, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 338, 351 (1955).
19Op. cit., 8upra, n. 18, p. 355.
21See 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 565 (1949).
188 Md. 677, 682, 53 A. 2d 579 (1947).
"8 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 95A, § 6(e) (1), supra,n. 2.
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nates the grade or class provision. This, however, should
be the function of the legislature,2 3 as the Court in the
instant case indicates:
"Understandably, the claimants argue that to deny
them benefits makes them victims of a labor dispute in
which they had no interest. On the other hand, if
such argument was accepted by us, it would have the
effect of equating the provisions of sec. 6 (e) (2) ...
with those of sec. 6(e) (1) ...thereby virtually eliminating sec. 6(e) (2) from the statute."24
It must be kept in mind that the grade or class provision
is an exception to disqualification. The statute says in
effect that a claimant shall be disqualified, but if he does
not belong to a grade or class of workers engaged in the
dispute, he will be entitled to benefits.25 Being an exception, it should not be construed so broadly as the courts
tend to do.2" Thus, we can see that if the provision is construed broadly, it frustrates the purpose of the Act, and
if it is interpreted narrowly, it virtually eliminates the
utility of it.
Under the provision, even claimants otherwise eligible
for benefits will be disqualified if one fellow employee of
their grade or class is himself disqualified by participating,
2
financing, or being directly interested in the disputeY.
The irrationality and arbitrariness of the application of
the provision is perhaps most clearly shown in a Pennsylvania case where a claimant received benefits under a
statute with no grade or class provision, but when the
statute was amended to include the provision, the claimant
was held to be disqualified.2 8
It is not clear what the approach of the Maryland Court
will be to a case lacking the element of a continuous integrated production process analogous to that of an assembly line. It is clear, however, that until the grade or
Op. cit., supra, n. 18, p. 375.
"219 Md. 146, 154, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959).
Sec. 6(e), supra, n. 21.
Op. cit., supra, n. 18, p. 351; see also 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 558 (1949).
In Re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma L. Co., 7 Wash. 2d 580,
110 P. 2d 877 (1941). A picket line was set up and ten claimants were told
not to return to work until called by the company. Eight others were told
to report but refused to do so because of the picket line. 'By refusing to
pass through the picket line, these eight became participants and were
therefore disqualified. The other ten, being engaged- in the same work as
the eight who refused to pass through the lines, were disqualified because
they were of the same grade or clas8 'as those participating; see also the
illustration in 8 Vand. I Rev. 338, 351 (1955).
See 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 565, n. 104 (1949).
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class provision is abolished, the Court will dutifully adhere
to it:
"It may be that the statute should be amended, but
whether the strikers, under circumstances similar to
those present here, would be acting solely for themselves or would also be acting directly or indirectly
for the claimants, is a decision the lawmakers must
make."2 9
The most logical approach would be to eliminate the
grade or class provision altogether. This would further the
ultimate purpose of the statute, which seemingly should
outweigh the more narrow justification for keeping the
provision, that of preventing the key-man work stoppage.
FRANK J. VECELLA

Estate Tax Deduction For An Entire Trust Containing
Charitable Bequest With A Possible Diversion
Of Trust Income
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. U.S.'
This was an action by the testator's executor to recover
estate taxes alleged to have been erroneously and illegally
collected. The testator, Dr. Raymond D. Havens, was a
resident of Baltimore City. After a number of specific bequests, he willed the residue of his estate as follows:
"Eighth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal and wheresoever situated, I give to my Trustee ... to hold, manage, invest,
and reinvest the same and pay to my sister, Ruth Mack
Havens so much of the net income as in its sole discretion it deems necessary and proper for her reasonable living expenses, comfort, maintenance, and general welfare. My Trustee in exercising this discretion
shall, however, take into consideration all assets owned
by her and any income received from any other source
of which my Trustee may have knowledge. It is my
desire that the discretionary power given to my Trus219 Md. 148, 154, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959). See a recent Pennsylvania case
remarkably similar on the facts to the instant case and citing it with
approval; U.S. Steel Oorp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 189
Pa. Super. 362, 150 A. 2d 361 (1959). And see cases collected in 28 A.L.R.
2d 287, 340-343.
'172 F. Supp. 72 (D. Md. 1959).

